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Beginning with Muhammad’s forceful consolidation of Arabia in 631 CE, the 
Rashidun and Umayyad Caliphates completed a series of conquests that would later 
become a hallmark of the early Islamic empire. Following the Prophet’s death, the 
Rashidun Caliphate (632-661) engulfed the Levant in the north, North Africa from Egypt 
to Tunisia in the west, and the Iranian plateau in the east. Following the end of the 
Rashidun, the Umayyad Caliphate (661-750) also racked up extensive military victories. 
In the early eighth century, this empire expanded further and attained control of the 
Caucasus, Transoxiana, Sindh, the Maghreb, and the notable Iberian Peninsula.1 With 
these additions, the Islamic state emerged as one of the largest empires in the pre-modern 
world, with a population of over thirty million people, overwhelmingly non-Muslim.2 
Now under Muslim control, these newly conquered non-Muslim communities brought 
with them an array of religious traditions including Judaism, Christianity, Zoroastrianism, 
Buddhism, Hinduism, and Animism.  
During this period, the majority of people saw religion as the largest aspect of an 
individual’s identity. For many individuals, their identity was derived primarily from 
their religion as it dictated an individual’s morals, daily behavior, and understanding of 
the world. The importance of religion in relation to identity is demonstrated by how texts 
from the seventh and eighth century refer to settled populations within a city by their 
 
1 Please see illustration two at the end of the paper for a map of the Umayyad empire in 750 CE at the end 
of their conquests. For a concise discussion of the early Islamic conquests, see Fred Donner, “The Islamic 
Conquests,” in A Companion to the History of the Middle East, ed. Youssef Choueiri (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2008), 28-51. 
2 Blankinship, Khalid Yahya. The End of the jihâd State: the Reign of Hishām Ibn ʻAbd Al-Malik and the 
Collapse of the Umayyads. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994, pp. 37 
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religion. Rather than using social status or ethnicity in order to classify people, authors 
perceived population as consisting of different religious groups. As a result, in many 
texts, local people were referred to as the Jews or the Christians of a specific city or 
region and were governed based on these groups. While the distinction between non-
Muslims will be covered in depth later, Christians and Jews were regularly mentioned 
because they are the People of the Book (ahl al-kitab) and therefore were afforded higher 
regard than other religious faiths.3 With religion taking center stage, the state could not 
depend on their mere presence to ensure their legitimacy in the eyes of the people since 
the average person had few inherent ties to the state, particularly in regards to their 
identity.4 
Based on this understanding, the challenge that the Islamic empire faced would 
have been considerable. As representatives of the newest religion in the Mediterranean in 
the seventh and eighth century, Muslim conquerors had to both subdue the local 
populations and get them to accept an administration that had a different understanding of 
the world. From its foundation, religion was interwoven into the empire’s politics and 
culture. Two classic examples of this inherent link is Muhammad’s rule and the Muslim 
community’s choice of rulers or caliphs after the Prophet’s death. After the Hijra to 
Medina in 622 CE, Muhammad became the head of an emerging state while maintaining 
his position as the leader of a religious community known as the Community of Believers 
or the umma.5 As the final prophet of God, Muhammad established himself as both the 
 
3 Friedmann, Yohanan. Tolerance and Coercion in Islam: Interfaith Relations in the Muslim Tradition. New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 58-59. 
4 For a more detailed discussion of non-Muslims identity in relation to Muslims, please see Yohanan 
Friedmann’s book Tolerance and Coercion in Islam: Interfaith Relations in the Muslim Tradition. 
5 Donner, Fred M. 2016. The Early Islamic Conquests, pp. 54-55 
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religious and political leader of the Muslim community. Following the death of the 
Prophet in 632 CE, and as the latter had not designated a successor, a dispute emerged 
within the Muslim community on who should be the caliph. One portion of the Muslim 
community thought that caliph needed to be a member of the Holy Family which meant 
having a direct familial relationship to the Prophet.6 On the other hand, many believed 
that the new ruler only needed to be a qualified member of the Community of Believers, 
preferably a close associate of the Prophet from his tribe, the Quraysh of Mecca.7 Among 
other reasons, this debate was significant because Muhammad’s death occurred shortly 
after his consolidation of the Arabian tribes. From the perspective of some of these tribes, 
since they created pacts with Muhammad, they believed themselves released from their 
agreements after his death.8 Thus, in order to keep this young empire together, it was 
extremely important that the caliph was legitimate in the eyes of his Muslim subjects both 
religiously and politically. As history shows, neither sides’ option, Ali or Abu Bakr, were 
able to garner complete legitimacy with the Muslim community. This ultimately helped 
lead to the division of the Shia and Sunni sects that is seen in Islam today.9  
As the young religious community and the Islamic state emerged hand in hand, 
inseparable from one another, the Muslim conquerors in the seventh and eighth centuries 
had to tackle the challenge of legitimizing their rule in the eyes of their predominantly 
non-Muslim subjects. According to Richard Bulliet, Muslims only consisted of 5-6% of 
 
6 Jonathan Berkey, The Formation of Islam: Religion and Society in the Near East, 600 -1800, Cambridge 
University Press, 2002, pp. 83-90. 
7 Crone, Patricia. 2004. Medieval Islamic Political Thought. Edinburgh University Press, pp. 17-18. 
8 Donner, Fred M. 2016. The Early Islamic Conquests, pp. 109-110. 
9 Please note that this is an extremely simplified explanation of what was a monumental turning point in 
Islamic history. For a more comprehensive discussion on the events following the Prophet’s death, see 
Jonathan Berkey, The Formation of Islam: Religion and Society in the Near East, 600-1800. 
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the population in Islamic territories in 720 CE.10 This made it particularly important for 
the Islamic empire to be seen as legitimate by their new citizens as there was always fear 
of revolt following a period of conquest. Faced with this framework, the Rashidun and 
the Umayyad Caliphates knew they needed to legitimize their rule using a variety of 
tactics both during and following their conquests. Ultimately, these tactics, which will 
also be referred to as legitimacy practices, facilitated the integration and assimilation of 
non-Muslims into the Islamic empire. In turn, this integration was important because it 
was a key feature in helping create the multifaceted, long lasting Muslim empire that 
scholars know today. 
Historiography 
Although surrender agreements have existed for hundreds of years, there has been 
limited research dedicated solely to their study. By and large, scholars of Islamic history 
have delved into many different aspects of the early Islamic conquests, the Rashidun 
caliphate, and the Umayyad empire. Examples of the most investigated topics include the 
empire’s military and political history as seen in Gerald R. Hawting’s book The First 
Dynasty of Islam: the Umayyad caliphate AD 661-750 and Fred Donner’s Early Islamic 
Conquests. Additionally, historians have also investigated more concentrated topics such 
as non-Muslims, siyar (Islamic international law), relations between Muslims and 
dhimmis, and early conversion to Islam. However, due to the many aspects of early 
Islamic life, historians have not been able to give every topic the attention it requires. As 
a result, surrender agreements as a specific aspect of the history of non-Muslims along 
 




with the formation of the concept of dhimmi and the treatment of non-Muslims in dar al-
Islam (Abode of Islam) have not been paid enough attention. Thankfully, over the last 
fifty years, research has continued to evolve as scholars work to develop a more accurate 
and cohesive picture of this time period. 
In recent years, this new picture has come more into focus thanks to the work of a 
number of scholars. In regards to surrender agreements, one of the most significant 
among these individuals is Milka Levy-Rubin and her book Non-Muslims in the Early 
Islamic Empire: From Surrender to Coexistence. Unlike most authors before her, Levy-
Rubin dedicated her entire work to these agreements. This decision allowed her to 
demonstrate a comprehensive understanding of their ancient lineage, their characteristics, 
their evolution, and the procedures they followed. One of the most valuable features of 
her book is how Levy-Rubin includes an array of primary source examples of surrender 
agreements.11 Recorded by medieval historians, these examples are what authors and 
their informants said was written in the agreements based on what they saw or reports 
they heard. While these sources present their own problems, Levy-Rubin is able to make 
much of this documentation accessible to readers by including English translations of 
these agreements in her book and giving them historical context.12 For all its positives, it 
is worthwhile to mention that Levy-Rubin was not able to cover every aspect of surrender 
agreements. The goal of this paper then is to build upon Levy-Rubin’s work and add 
some fresh remarks specifically in regard to the impact of these surrender agreements on 
the integration of non-Muslims.  
 
11 Levy -Rubin, Milka. Non-Muslims in the Early Islamic Empire: From Surrender to Coexistence, pp. 50-56. 
12 Ibid, 171-172. 
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Despite the skill of modern historians, there are a number of inevitable issues that 
occur when studying seventh and eighth century surrender agreements. The first of these 
problems is the fact that the documentation that has survived is typically a record of the 
historian’s informants who were not always direct witnesses of the events surrounding an 
agreement or the agreement itself. Furthermore, it is extremely rare that a copy of an 
agreement survived. This fact forced historians to write their records based on what their 
informants and oral tradition remembered. Moreover, modern scholars usually get their 
information about these agreements from medieval historians who were writing period 
summaries decades after they occurred. Unlike today, this practice was not uncommon as 
later historians frequently wrote the history of earlier periods in Islamic history. Well-
known examples of historians like this are ʾAḥmad ibn Yaḥyā al-Balādhurī, Abū Jaʿfar 
Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, and Abū'l-Ḥusayn Hilāl b. Muḥassin b. Ibrahīm al-
Ṣābi'.13  
Traditionally, these historians were not tremendously concerned about ensuring 
the accuracy of events they recorded. Moreover, like all historians, these individuals had 
a purpose for writing and their motivation effected how they portrayed events.14 One 
example of this can be seen in Levy-Rubin’s work when she briefly mentions the claims 
by A. Noth who believed that many reports, particularly those on the conquest of Egypt 
and Iraq, did not originate at the time of the conquest and instead were written later to fit 
 
13 To clarify, these are only examples of historians who wrote summaries of earlier periods of Islamic 
history. It is not a list of those who have depicted Islamic history as religiously oppressive. Jonathan 
Berkey, The Formation of Islam: Religion and Society in the Near East, 600 -1800, Cambridge University 
Press, 2002, pp. 224-248. 
14 Lambton, Ann K. S. 2014. State and Government in Medieval Islam, pp. 204. 
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Umayyad political agendas.15 While this claim was made by a single author, Levy-Rubin 
states that it is of course possible that specific reports were modified later to support 
personal interests. While there is no guarantee that Noth is correct, the manner in which 
Levy-Rubin responded to his claims showcase how frequently historians manipulated 
history. 
Beyond the limited unreliability of these initial recorders, this documentation was 
also subject to numerous translations as it traveled from location to location. Over time, a 
single piece of evidence could be translated, interpreted, and copied countless times by 
different readers. Each time these changes occurred, there was a chance that the newly 
translated or copied document conveyed a slightly different message than the original. 
Even if a translator did his best work, there are some phrases and/or meanings in every 
language that cannot be translated verbatim. In addition, in historical documents, types of 
contractual settlements are also referred to as pacts and treaties. While there is no way of 
knowing for sure if these two terms refer to surrender agreements or if they maintain the 
same definition in each source, the context of the document can be used to help define its 
meaning. 
Despite these recording issues, additional research on surrender agreements is still 
valuable. As with most documentation, even if scholars do not have a complete record of 
the original document, there is still much that can be learned from what did survive. By 
studying these agreement fragments, it is clear that the early Islamic empire was able to 
gain legitimacy by utilizing surrender agreements. Part of an ancient practice, these 
 
15 Levy-Rubin, Milka. Non-Muslims in the Early Islamic Empire : From Surrender to Coexistence. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 36. 
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agreements created a social framework by defining and regulating the relationship 
between different religious traditions and Muslims. As a result, surrender agreements 
offer a window into the developing relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in dar 
al-Islam as the latter was expanding. In addition, they shed considerable light on the 
evolving conceptualization of non-Muslims’ place in dar al-Islam from the point of view 
of Islamic legal tradition and political theory. By defining this relationship in a 
framework that was agreed on by all parties and one that preserved the basic rights of 
non-Muslims, these agreements were remarkably effective in facilitating the acceptance 
and incorporation of non-Muslims into Muslim society.16 Using this background, it is 
clear that the original, actual surrender agreements, concluded upon the Muslim conquest, 
contributed to non-Muslims’ integration into the early Islamic caliphate by defining non-
Muslims’ social, political, and legal status in relation to Muslims in dar al-Islam. 
Typically separated into two phases, both the early, original surrender agreements 
concluded at the time of the conquest, and the later version of surrender agreements that 
claimed to be “authentic”, formed the basis of the legal, juristic articulation of the 
evolving status of dhimmis in the Abode of Islam as a part of the development of Islamic 
international law (siyar).17 
Surrender Agreements 
Emerging in the early seventh century, Islam was established by the Prophet 
Muhammad based on revelations believed to be God’s words and communicated to the 
 
16 To be clear, in this setting, integration refers to the accepted inclusion of an individual into Islamic 
society. 
17 Shaybani, and Majid Khadduri. 1966. Shaybani's Siyar: the Islamic law of nations. Baltimore, Md: Johns 
Hopkins, pp. 142-157. 
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Prophet by Archangel Gabriel. After his visit with Gabriel, Muhammad introduced Islam 
as a universalist, Abrahamic religion in the city of Mecca.18 As a major trading city in the 
Arabian peninsula, Muhammad’s location, his place in the Quraysh tribe, his persona, 
and his marriage to Khadija, a wealthy business woman, all aided him in gathering his 
first followers.19 In addition, while Islam was distinctly different from the idolatry that 
dominated Arabia, its similarities to Judaism and Christianity were familiar. As Judaism 
and Christianity had already established a long-term presence in the Arabian Peninsula, 
they were well-known there.20 As a result, when Muhammad began preaching about a 
new faith, the people of Mecca would have had an understanding of Islam’s basic 
principles based on the religious context that was available in the region.21 Thus, while in 
Mecca, Muhammad was able to gain a following and establish Islam as the newest 
Abrahamic religion.  
 Although the people of Mecca knew of the Abrahamic religions, there were many 
individuals who were not accepting of Islam. This in addition to political strife forced 
Muhammad and his followers to move to Medina in 622 CE in a migration known as the 
Hijra. Originally invited to Medina as a mediator, it is here Muhammad would become 
 
18 One of the most significant aspects of Islam is its universalist nature. As the wording suggests, this 
feature allowed any non-Muslims who desired to, to become Muslim. This ability was particularly 
important during the first few decades of Islam as it allowed Muhammad to appeal to and gain much 
needed followers. The ability to convert appealed to dissatisfied individuals from all walks of life by giving 
them the opportunity to break away from a society based on tribal relations and enter one where the 
strength of your faith dictates your social position. 
19 Donner, Fred M. 2016. The Early Islamic Conquests, pp. 50-53 
20 Kennedy, Hugh. The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphate: The Islamic Near East from the Sixth Century 
to the Eleventh Century, pp. 20. 
21 Beyond their proximity to the Byzantines, the people of Arabia were also knowledgeable about Judaism 
and Christianity due to the tribes of Arab Jews as well as various Christians living in the peninsula. A great 
example of this is three prominent tribes that were located in and around Medina during the time of 
Muhammad. These tribes include the Banu Nadir, the Banu Qaynuqa, and the Banu Qurayza. Cited from 
Muhammad: Legacy of a Prophet - Muhammad and Jews of Medina.” PBS. 
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the political leader of the umma as Islam transformed from only a religion to a political 
entity bound by religious ties.22 Linked to this change was the fact that Islam was 
becoming a religion of conquest as Muhammad and his followers engaged in military 
conflicts with the Meccans and Jewish tribes in Medina.23 The Prophet also continued his 
practice of forming alliances with nomadic tribes using of pacts.24 Eventually, through 
military and diplomatic means, Muhammad would unite the tribes of Arabia under his 
control, setting the stage for the early Islamic conquests.    
 Throughout these early years of Islam, the concept of jihad emerged based on the 
words and military actions of Muhammad as well as the words of the Qur’an. At this 
time, jihad referred to the ability for Muslims to wage justifiable war against an enemy in 
defense of Islam.25 Seen as a collective obligation rather than an individual one, the aim 
of jihad was to defend, and at times expand, the Islamic state. Importantly, jihad was not 
allowed to be used to convert non-Muslims to Islam if they surrendered peacefully to the 
Muslim conquerors and thus earned dhimmi status. For Muslims, this obligation 
contributed to their understanding of how the world was divided. On one side, there is the 
Abode of Islam or dar al-Islam which is the land under the control of an Islamic state and 
 
22 Donner, Fred M. 2016. The Early Islamic Conquests, pp. 54-55 
23 Muhammad: Legacy of a Prophet - Muhammad and Jews of Medina.” PBS. 
24 Though Muhammad used other diplomatic methods including gift giving and promises of power, his 
practice of using pacts was faithfully recorded in the Qur’an. Although different from surrender 
agreements, these pacts were used to bring tribes under Muhammad’s control swiftly and through 
minimal bloodshed. In addition, there were stipulations that both sides of the pact had to uphold in order 
for the pact to remain viable. As a result, it is possible that these pacts provided a historical background 
for the acceptance of surrender agreements by the early Muslim conquers in addition to that provide by 
the Romans and Sasanians. In addition, Fred Donner’s book The Early Islamic Conquests refers to these 
pacts on pages 108-109. 
25 There are two other definition of jihad that Muslims use including when they refer to a believer's 
internal struggle to live out the Muslim faith. However, for this paper, jihad’s definition will be that of an 
armed conflict against an enemy. For a discussion on the different definitions of jihad and their 
development, see David Cook’s book Understanding Jihad. 
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it is governed according to Sharia (Islamic law). In contrast, there is the Abode of War or 
dar al-harb which is the locations not governed by Sharia law and thus filled with 
unbelievers who are perceived to be potential enemies.26 In theory then, the ultimate goal 
of jihad is to continue the struggle against dar al-harb until the world is dar al-Islam, 
leaving no potential threats to the state.  
In addition to this ideal, another feature of jihad was that it was governed by a set 
of rules including ones that prohibited harming those who were not engaged in combat.27 
Moreover, the Qur’an addressed when Muslims could perform jihad and when they could 
not. In verse 4:90, the text states, “Therefore if they withdraw from you but fight you not, 
and (instead) send you (Guarantees of) peace, then Allah Hath opened no way for you (to 
war against them).”28 Based on this record, it is clear that the Qur’an outlines rules for 
those that can be waged war on. In addition, it is interesting that those who wish to make 
peace are protected by the Qur’an since this sura would prevent pious Muslims from 
entering into armed conflict with individuals who desired peace. However, since the text 
does not elaborate further, there is not enough evidence, solely on the basis of this sura, 
to determine what this “guarantee of peace” is referring to or its significance. 
 Following Muhammad’s consolidation of Arabia in the seventh century, the 
Islamic state launched into a period of rapid expansion. During this period, Muslim 
conquerors participated in two types of conquest: sulkhan and anwatan.29 The first refers 
 
26 Crone, Patricia. 2004. Medieval Islamic Political Thought. Edinburgh University Press, pp. 359-362. 
27 Blankinship, Khalid Yahya. “Parity of Muslim and Western Concepts of Just War.” The Muslim 
World 101, no. 3 (2011): 412–26, pp. 416. 
28 Nikayin, Fazlollah. 2017. Quran. Cork: BookBaby.  
29 Lambton, Ann K. S. 2014. State and Government in Medieval Islam, pp. 204. 
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to conquest through a binding agreement or sulh while the second is conquest by force.30 
The difference between these two forms of conquest was significant because they had a 
lasting role in how non-Muslims in these cities were treated both legally and socially. For 
cities taken using anwatan, the Muslim conquerors were permitted to do as they pleased 
with the conquered populations. This was largely because there was not sulh that created 
a legal agreement between the two parties. 
On the other hand, for cities conquered using sulkhan, a legally binding 
agreement was in place that defined the relation between Muslims and non-Muslims.31 
While this will be discussed more in depth later, an individual’s religious tradition and 
their relation with the conquerors determined how this agreement would affect them. 
Thus, an agreement is going to impact an individual who is considered dhimmi and 
Christian differently than an individual who is not dhimmi and Manichaean. In addition, 
there were different types of contractual agreements beyond surrender agreements that 
non-Muslims entered into. Not considered a surrender agreement, one good example of a  
different type of agreement is the one made with the Nubians in the mid-seventh century.  
According to Al-Tabari’s history, the governor of Egypt, ‘Abdallah b. Sa’d b. Abi 
Sarh, established a peace treaty with the Nubians following a huge military defeat due to 
the Nubian’s superior bowmanship.32 For the Nubians, this treaty required that they offer 
the Muslims a gift of a number of people to be used as a labor force. In exchange, every 
 
30 Levy -Rubin, Milka. Non-Muslims in the Early Islamic Empire : From Surrender to Coexistence. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 36. 
31 Ibid, 63. 
32 Ṭabarī, and G. H. A. Juynboll. The History of Al-Tabari Vol. 13 : The Conquest of Iraq, Southwestern 
Persia, and Egypt: The Middle Years of ’Umar’s Caliphate A.D. 636-642/A.H. pp. 175.  Still present today, 
Nubians are an ethno-linguistic group of people who are indigenous to southern Egypt. 
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year, the Muslims would give them specific foodstuffs and garments. Based on al-
Tabari’s record, ‘Abdallah b. Sa’d b. Abi Sarh and the governors and commanders who 
lived after him honored this agreement, largely out of concern for the well-being of the 
Muslims.33 From this example, it is clear that there were various types of sulh (including 
surrender agreements) that varied based on the local circumstances. In addition, this 
example demonstrates the importance of these agreements for both the conquered and 
conquerors as it sets in place a binding legal agreement that is honored by tradition and 
Islamic law.34 
During their conquests, Muslim military leaders utilized a number of instruments 
of legitimization as they worked their way across the known world. Among these tactics, 
one of the most established was the use of surrender agreements. In her book Non-
Muslims in the Early Islamic Empire: From Surrender to Coexistence, Milka Levy-Rubin 
offers a quality account of what these agreements entailed. According to Levy-Rubin, at 
their core, surrender agreements were a promise of security given by Muslim invaders in 
exchange for payment, typically the poll-tax (jizya) or some other form of tribute, by the 
conquered population.35 Besides its financial purpose, the payment of jizya by dhimmi 
served as a physical representation and recognition of the Muslims’ rule, as well as a way 
to “humble” non-Muslims, as prescribed in the Qur’an (9:29).36 The security given in 
exchange for this payment consisted of the civilians’ lives, their property, and their right 
to continue living according to their ancestral laws without Muslim interference.37 As the 
 
33 Ibid, 176. 
34 Levy -Rubin, Milka. Non-Muslims in the Early Islamic Empire : From Surrender to Coexistence. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 63. 
35 Ibid, 24. 
36 Ibid, 43. 
37 Donner, Fred M. 2016. The Early Islamic Conquests, pp. 246. 
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foundation of all surrender agreements, this exchange was written into most agreements 
from the conquests along with details regarding the payment of jizya which was usually 
paid using coin, material goods, or services to Muslims. Examples of possible payment 
methods included horses, hides, armor, military assistance, or acting as a guide for 
Muslims. Due to their simple nature and few obligations, these surrender agreements did 
not impose burdensome restrictions on the lives of non-Muslims and left them in relative 
peace to continue their lives undisturbed. 
In addition to their simplicity, there was also a specific procedure that Muslim 
conquerors followed when establishing an agreement. Upon approaching a new 
settlement, Muslim military leaders would send a member of their force with an offer of 
peace.38 Otherwise faced with war, representatives of the population would parley with 
the general of the Islamic force and agree to surrender if certain conditions were fulfilled. 
Negotiations between the two would take place and the document had to be ratified by 
the sovereign body of each side. After an agreement was reached, the documents would 
be signed, witnessed, and sealed. Often written in two languages, a copy of the document 
was given to both parties for future reference.39 Normally, a surrender agreement lasted 
for a set amount of time or until the death of one of the representatives or their sovereign 
leader after which the pact needed to be renewed.  
The practice of both parties getting a copy is significant because it allowed 
surrendered populations to hold Muslims legally accountable if the terms of the 
agreement were broken. Interestingly, many of the records scholars have of early 
 
38 Levy -Rubin, Milka. Non-Muslims in the Early Islamic Empire: From Surrender to Coexistence, pp 12. 
39 Ibid, 10-11. 
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surrender agreements come from this type of use as historians mention town leaders 
referring to their copy during a local dispute or renewal. One great example of this is how 
in the late seventh century, the people of the city of Tuflis brought their copy of their 
agreement to al-Jarrah b. ʿAbdallah al-Hakami who took over governorship of the region 
of Khurasan following the accession of Umar II.40 Originally signed by Habıb b. 
Maslama, the new governor renewed Tuflis’ agreement using the local population’s 
original copy.41  
In regards to non-Muslims, it is important to understand that the Islamic caliphate 
defined and categorized non-Muslims for legal and administrative purposes. Typically, an 
individual was labelled both by their religious belief and their relationship related to 
Muslims in terms of Islamic law. For the latter, there were usually three groups that a 
person could fall into: dhimmis (ahl al-dhimma), “people of the armistice” (ahl al-
hudna), or “people who received guarantee of safety” (ahl al-aman). Known as protected 
people, dhimmis were non-Muslims who agreed to live under Islamic rule and received 
permanent protection from Muslims. The people of the armistice were those who were 
not under Islamic rule, were not living in Islamic lands, and their only requirement was to 
not war against the Muslims. Finally, the people who receive a guarantee of safety are 
those who stay in Muslim territory temporarily and do not pay jizya such as merchants, 
envoys, and traders.42  
 
40 al-Baladhurı, Ahmad b. Yahya, Ansab al-ashraf, ed. M. Schloessinger, Jerusalem 1971, pp. 201-202 
41 Levy -Rubin, Milka. Non-Muslims in the Early Islamic Empire : From Surrender to Coexistence, pp. 39-40 
42 Friedmann, Yohanan. Tolerance and Coercion in Islam: Interfaith Relations in the Muslim Tradition. New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 54-56. 
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In addition, a person is also categorized by their religious belief. Generally called 
infidels, common religious groups included Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians, polytheists, 
and heretics who were typically associated with the Manichaeans and the Samaritans. 
These labels can overlap since, for example, a person can be a Jew and a dhimmi.43 
Overall, these categories are extremely significant because the Islamic empire used them 
in their legal and administrative institutions. Since surrender agreements were an 
integral part of these institutions, these categories were also used in agreement documents 
in relations to a specific town or region’s non-Muslims. For non-Muslims, these groups 
were how the empire determined an individual’s rights and obligations since the laws 
were recorded based on these categories. In addition, an individual’s classification 
dictated their relationship with Muslims and other religious groups.  
For example, in the book Tolerance and Coercion in Islam, the text states, “Umar 
b. al-Khattab did not take jizya from the Zoroastrians of Hajar until he was told by Abd 
al-Rahman b. Awf that the Prophet has levied it from the Zoroastrians of Hajar and 
enjoined the Muslims to treat them as they would treat People of the Book44.”45 This 
excerpt demonstrates that individuals were recognize in Islamic law and administration 
based on two labels: their religion and their relationship related to Muslims. Knowing 
these categories was extremely important because, as one can see, different religious 
groups were granted different rights and held to different obligations. In addition, this 
 
43 Ibid, 55-58. 
44 Typically referred to as a homogenous group, the People of the Book were Jews and Christians. For a 
more detailed discussion on People of the Book and their legal status, please see Yohanan Friedmann’s 
Tolerance and Coercion in Islam: Interfaith Relations in the Muslim Tradition. 
45 Friedmann, Yohanan. Tolerance and Coercion in Islam: Interfaith Relations in the Muslim Tradition. New 
York, pp. 73-74. 
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example shows that Muslims, in this case Umar b. al-Khattab, was careful to honor the 
recorded rights’ of these groups due to their legal and administrative significance.  
According to Islamic law, surrender agreements were considered to be legally 
binding documents and were treated as such by the Muslim authorities.46 A good 
demonstration of this is a dispute recorded by Ibn al-Mu’alla who reported that he read a 
document written by the qadi of Damascus, Yahya b. Hamza.47 In this document, the 
qadi reports how the Christians of the city came to him, claiming the Muslims had taken 
over their churches and asked him to fulfill the agreement made with them by Khalid b. 
al-Walid. After reviewing the agreement they produced and the jizya, the qadi sided with 
the Christians, ruling the Muslims needed to return the property or compensate them 
adequately.48 This record and those like it are enlightening because they demonstrate how 
these agreements functioned first and foremost as a protection of dhimmi’s rights 
including personal property and religious freedom. In fact, according to Levy-Rubin, 
from the late eighth century onwards, “…these agreements often seemed an 
encroachment upon the rights of the Muslims. Nevertheless, they were respected by the 
Muslim authorities.”49 Interestingly, this idea is in direct contrast to how most traditional 
 
46 Levy -Rubin, Milka. Non-Muslims in the Early Islamic Empire: From Surrender to Coexistence, pp. 40. 
47 “Ibn ʿAsakir, Ta ʾrıkh madınat dimashq, vol. VI, pp. 19-21” as cited in Levy -Rubin, Milka. Non-Muslims in 
the Early Islamic Empire: From Surrender to Coexistence, pp. 40. 
48 The jizya was a type of tax. In the Islamic empire, what type of tax a town or tribe paid depended on the 
identification of that group. According to Islamic law, sedentary Muslim populations were required to pay 
zakat or alms. In reality, though, the payment of zakat was much less regular than payment of jizya by 
non-Muslims. In addition, zakat was only levied on Muslims who can afford it. Since most Muslims did not 
have much money, many were not required to pay it.  In contrast, the jizya (tax or tribute) was levied 
against sedentary populations of non-Muslims, most commonly Jews or Christians, who chose to retain 
their faith. The collection of the jizya was highly regulated compared to the zakat because the Umayyad 
empire depended on this tax to finance its administration. Cited in Donner, Fred M. 2016. The Early 
Islamic Conquests, pp. 252-253. 
49 Levy -Rubin, Milka. Non-Muslims in the Early Islamic Empire: From Surrender to Coexistence, pp. 40 
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narratives have depicted the Islamic empire. In the minds of many, the Islamic empire 
was characterized by religious oppression and the stifling of local populations. As these 
surrender agreements help demonstrate, this narrative is not accurate as local populations 
were entitled to religious freedom and the right to practice even from the earliest days of 
the empire.  
In regards to surrender agreements, it is important to note that there were many 
different variations of these agreements. While there was a uniform structure to them, 
their purpose for the empire was multifaceted and needed to fit the circumstances of each 
population.50 By negotiating with the conquered, these agreement secured a swift victory 
for the empire, established the conquerors’ relationship with the local population, built a 
daily social framework, and legitimized their rule. On the other hand, these agreements 
helped conquered populations ensure the continuation of their daily lives and their 
livelihoods. Depending on the background of that region or town, this continuation took 
slightly different forms. Thus, in order to create an agreement that was acceptable for 
both sides, the content of these documents needed to be malleable depending on the 
population’s needs.  
The basic pattern of surrender agreements in the age of the Islamic conquests was 
set as early as in the time of the Prophet Muhammad, when the Muslims, under the 
leadership of the Prophet himself, were consolidating their control over the Arabian 
Peninsula. Reported by al-Baladhuri, a good example of this is the surrender agreement 
made in 631 CE by the city of Najran.51 Located in southwest Arabia, Najran consisted of 
 
50 Ibid, 49 
51 Kitab Futuh al-Buldan, ed. M. J. de Goeje, Leiden 1866 ; trans. P. K. Hitti as The Origins of the Islamic 
State, New York 1916, pp. 98-105. 
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Christians and Jews who made an agreement with representatives of Muhammad. 
Allegedly orchestrated by two monks, this document is similar in nature to other 
surrender agreements that would come later on during the conquest. This similarity is 
primarily due to the fact that this agreement was simple, outlining the exchange of a 
yearly tax and acceptance of Muslim rule in exchange for the promise of protection. For 
the Jews and Christians of Najran, this deal was significant because it guaranteed that 
they would be left alone if they fulfilled a few very specific conditions.52  
The most in depth portion of the document explains how Najarn would pay the 
jizya. In this case, this city of Jews and Christians had to provide two thousand robes 
annually to the Muslims and provide visiting Muslims lodging. In addition, in the event 
of war with al-Yaman, the city was required to loan the Muslims thirty coats of mail 
along with thirty horses and camels each.53 It is interesting that these later materials were 
given as a loan, not a tribute, and that Muhammad guaranteed that the Muslims would 
return them. Not common in later agreements, the presence of loaning in this document 
supports that idea that this agreement was created in the early days of the Islamic state, 
particularly since Muhammad did not have the equipment he needed to outfit his soldiers. 
Overall, this agreement is a good example of how Jews and Christians were incorporated 
into the Islamic state using surrender agreements from the empire’s very beginning.  
During the conquests, the form in which jizya was paid by non-Muslims was 
flexible. This adaptability allowed a conquered population to negotiate with their Muslim 
conquerors in order to find a type of payment that they could provide. Oftentimes, this 
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modified payment was material goods or services that was equal in value to a currency 
amount.54 A good example of this flexibility was in the mid-seventh century when Ibn 
Amir, governor of Basra, accepted male and female slaves in place of having residents 
pay the poll tax.55 This stipulation was written into the agreements of a few towns across 
the Oxus in consideration of the fact that their resources and property were in material 
goods and not in physical currency.  
Interestingly, adjustments made to jizya was not only due to necessity or an 
unavoidable need like it most likely was in Basra. At times, it was prompted by a custom 
found in a specific town or a shared desire among townspeople. One clear example of this 
was the surrender agreement of Barkah (Barca) in east Libya.56 Created in the 640s, the 
military leader ‘Amr ibn-al-‘Asi agreed to allow the local Berbers to sell some of their 
children in order to pay the tribute. According to the surviving record, this stipulation was 
not imposed on them and, in the past, the Berbers had send the children they wanted to 
sell to the governor of Egypt without any urging.57 Overall, this was a local custom that 
the Berbers desired to continue and, rather than demand payment in dinars, the Muslim 
conquerors permitted it.  
In addition to Barkah, another example of a desired, optional change can be found 
in the surrender agreement of the city of Darband (northeast Iran). In their agreement, the 
 
54 Ibid. In the agreement with the city of Najran, the people are required to create two thousand robes 
annually to pay their jizya. Furthermore, this document makes it a point to record how much each robe 
equal in dinars (currency). The agreement also mentions that a change in the price of the robes would be 
taken into account when calculating the annual jizya. 
55 ʿAthamina, Khalil. 1998. "Non-Arab Regiments and Private Militias during the Umayyād 
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56 Kitab Futuh al-Buldan, ed. M. J. de Goeje, Leiden 1866 ; trans. P. K. Hitti as The Origins of the Islamic 
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local population asked that their tribute be in military assistance rather than the payment 
of the jizya (the poll-tax). This is because, in the townspeople’s perspective, paying this 
tax was considered humiliating and military aid was vastly preferable.58 Though not a 
necessary change, the Muslims acceded to this request and wrote it into their legally 
binding agreement with Darband. 
While the adaptability of these agreements might seem insignificant, this feature  
was extremely important to the success of surrender agreements. Being able to 
personalize these documents meant that the Muslim conquerors could modify an 
agreement until it was acceptable for the local, non-Muslim population.59 This in turn 
ensured that the conquerors could achieve a relatively short victory over a large area that 
included numerous towns. Without the ability to adapt to cultural characteristics and 
considerations, it is unlikely that non-Muslims would have accepted these agreements to 
the degree that they did. In addition, the ability to modify these documents from location 
to location inevitably created a variety of diverse agreements across the Middle East.60 
Although this will be discussed in depth later, this diversity would create frustration and 
upset among the Muslim population during the ninth century and would eventually be 
used as a reason to standardize these agreements into one. To provide an cohesive 
picture, at the end of this paper, illustration one conveys the locations of surrender 
agreements (or treaties) where the texts of these documents have been cited in written 
record. As the image shows, there is evidence of agreements spanning from Egypt to 
Iran. 
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As time went on, the basic pattern of surrender agreements would persist. 
Appearing well into the late stages of the Islamic conquests, this exchange of protection 
and relative independence for the payment of jizya can be seen in the conquest of Iberia 
in the 710s. Translated by Olivia R. Constable, the Treaty of Tudmir is one specific 
example of the persistence of this basic structure.61 Dated to 713 CE, this document was 
established between ‘Abd al-Aziz and Theodemir who was the local ruler of Murcia. 
Though brokered by Theodemir of Murcia, the agreement states that this document also 
applied to seven other towns in the area: Orihuela, Valentilla, Alicante, Mula, Bigastro, 
Ello, and Lorca. Relatively short, this translated document focuses extensively on 
outlining the services that the conquered would and would not have to complete. Specific 
stipulations that are mentioned include not removing Theodemir from power, not burning 
the town’s churches, and not coercing non-Muslims in matters of religion. In exchange, 
the conquered were required to not shelter fugitives, not encourage any protected people 
to fear the Muslims, and to abide by the agreement. Besides these aspects, the document 
also stated that each of Theodemir’s men had to pay one dinar per year along with four 
measures of wheat, barley, fruit juice, vinegar, honey, and olive oil.62 
Based on this translation, the Treaty of Tudmir is a typical surrender agreement. 
In both content and structure, this document appears to abide by the basic pattern and 
traditions established by the Romans centuries prior. In particular, it features protection 
and the promise to leave non-Muslims alone in exchange for the payment of taxes in the 
form of dinars and material goods. This tax was the subject that was explained in the 
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most detail and thus was most likely a point of serious negotiation between the two sides. 
In this context, this intense debate makes sense because, in the eyes of the conquered, the 
amount and type of tax would need to be something they could reasonably fulfill every 
year. In addition, since this agreement was made on the behalf of eight towns, this 
tradition also assisted the Muslims by granting them a quick conquest over a large area. 
One interesting aspect of this agreement was the inclusion of the stipulation that the 
conquered could not encourage any protected people to fear the Muslims.63 The addition 
of this stipulation signals that the Muslims were interested and invested in preventing 
strife in these new territories. Furthermore, by asking others not to fear them, this 
agreement supports the idea that the Islamic empire was using these documents to 
integrate non-Muslims into dar al-Islam. 
While all these examples were relatively straightforward, there were more 
complex surrender agreements, such as the multi-phase surrender in Alexandria in the 
640s. In order to understand the intricacy of this agreement, one can refer to The 
Chronicle of John (c. 690) Coptic Bishop of Nikiu in which John of Nikiu (a Coptic 
Bishop of Nikiu in the Nile Delta) recorded what he knew of the agreements of 
Alexandria. According to this source, in the early seventh century, the Melkite patriarch 
Cyrus of Alexandria travelled to Babylon (at Modern Old Cairo) which was serving as 
the headquarters of the Muslim army in Egypt. There, he negotiated a treaty with the 
Muslims in 641 CE on behalf of Egypt.64 Unfortunately for Cyrus, not everyone in 
Alexandria was happy that he made a legally binding agreement on their behalf. The 
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Diophysites of Alexandria were particularly upset with this occurrence. On the other 
hand, the Copts of the city welcomed it.65 This anger on the part of the Diophysites was 
why Cyrus was almost stoned to death after arriving back in Alexandria. Eventually, 
though, the city surrendered to the Muslims’ rule. However, a problem arose when the 
Byzantine emperor sent a general Manuil (Manuwil) who re-conquered the city for 
Byzantium.66 Sometime in the mid-640s, however, Alexandria surrendered again to the 
Muslims and agreed to pay jizya in exchange for dhimmi status for the non-Muslims in 
the city. 
In regards to the actual terms of the agreement, the second treaty outlined a fixed 
amount of tribute, the removal of Roman (Byzantine) troops from Alexandria, and the 
release of 150 soldiers and fifty civilians.67 In exchange, the Muslims agreed not to seize 
Christian churches, allowed Jews to stay in Alexandria, and to not intervene in the 
concerns of Christians. The record goes on to report that Cyrus was almost stoned to 
death by the people of Alexandria after the Muslims came for their tribute. According to 
the author, since the Alexandrians did not know about the agreement and could not fight 
off the Muslims, they planned to punish Cyrus instead. Fortunately, Cyrus was able to 
persuade them to his side and the Alexandrians felt ashamed of what they were going to 
do. In addition, after the initial treaty was made, Cyrus was tasked by his fellow 
Egyptians to negotiate with the Muslims once again. Driven out of their homes by fear, 
the Egyptians wanted the Muslims to promise to allow them to return to their cities and 
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considered Orthodox Christians. On the other hand, the Copts were Monophysites and therefore 
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become Muslim subjects. Once Cyrus accomplished this, the Muslims allegedly had 
control of all of Egypt.68 
 In this document, there is evidence that agreements were flexible in order to fit 
the demands of each city and region. The best instance of this is when the Egyptians 
asked for the conquerors’ promise that they could move back into their cities. This was 
significant because the Muslim conquerors agreed to give them back their land and to 
grant them the right to private and public property after they had abandon their city. If the 
land was not given back to the locals, this property could have been used for Muslims 
settlers or taken as booty. Thus, this concession on the part of the Muslims demonstrates 
their desire to integrate non-Muslims into their society by ensuring non-Muslims were 
present and relatively content with their daily circumstances.  
In addition, the record does not mention anything about the civilians or the 
Roman military bucking the Muslims’ authority following the treaty even though Cyrus 
secured this treaty without their consent. After being on the brink of war, this easy 
acceptance of a foreign power after learning about the treaty lends support to the belief 
that these agreements were grounded in Roman tradition.69 In addition, it is interesting 
that Cyrus was serving as a representative and negotiator for all the religious 
communities residing in Alexandra and not just the Melikites to whom he belonged. 
While this follows the established procedure of these agreements, other religious 
communities, like the Jews and the Monophysites, were held legally responsible for the 
terms that Cyrus agreed on, no matter if these obligations were sensible or not. The fact 
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that other groups were held to the obligations that a member of another religious 
community agreed on, could create issues and contributed to why Cyrus was going to be 
stoned to death.70 During this period, the threat of punishment initiated by public opinion 
acted as a safeguard against unfair or unsupported agreements. In Cyrus’ case, the 
Melkite of Alexandra did not agree with their patriarch about surrendering to the 
Muslims and thus, they attempted to impose public punishment on Cyrus. 
For the Islamic empire, surrender agreements played a central role in building 
legitimacy and facilitating non-Muslim integration. By creating a written agreement in 
which both the conquerors and conquered negotiated terms, Muslim rulers were able to 
gain legitimacy right off the bat as populations willingly entered into these agreements in 
exchange for protection. In addition, these surrender agreements set the social status, 
rights, and legal obligations of non-Muslims in their new Muslim communities. These 
clearly defined parameters helped non-Muslims integrate into a Muslim dominated 
society.  
Moreover, these agreements provided a sense of continuation for non-Muslims 
who were facing a rapidly growing empire that was distinctly different from those that 
had come before. From the beginning, most of the people in the caliphate were non-
Muslims who, under Islamic rule, were dominated by a religious, political, and military 
superior Muslim minority as Muslims gradually moved into previously non-Muslim 
cities. By the mid tenth century, Muslims would constitute the majority of the population 
in dar al-Islam.71 However, this was not the case during the first few centuries of Islamic 
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rule. For many, the practice of surrender agreements was reassuring since this type of 
agreement had been present in the Mediterranean since the Classical era. 
The Evolution of Surrender Agreements 
According to Levy-Rubin’s work, evidence of surrender agreements can be found 
on the Arabian Peninsula since the time of Muhammad.72 However, their basic principles 
are rooted in an ancient diplomatic tradition originating around the middle of the second 
millennium BCE in the ancient Near East.73 The tradition of surrender agreements along 
with their corresponding procedure was passed down over the centuries until it was 
firmly established in the public’s memory and history. In fact, according to Levy-Rubin, 
it was highly likely that the adoption of surrender agreements as a mechanism for 
surrender and a lasting social and legal institution was initiated by the conquered 
populations.74 This initiation was due to the fact that these populations had functioned 
according to agreements like these for centuries under the Byzantine empire. As a result, 
they desired to continue the tradition of surrender agreements because of their historical 
context and their ability to let locals carry on with their lives relatively undisturbed. This 
background facilitated the acceptance of this ancient practice by the Muslims conquerors 
shortly following the beginning of the conquests.75   
There is ample evidence of Byzantine treaties in the historical record. One useful 
example of this is a treaty signed in 505 AD after several years of war. According to the 
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chronicle of Marcellinus Comes, a treaty was established through the work of two 
traveling envoys, Celer and Armonius.76 This agreement brought an end to the war by 
deciding that the Sasanians would give the city of Amida to the Byzantines in exchange 
for one thousand pounds of gold. By studying these treaties, it is evident that this practice 
was ongoing based on the similarities in terminology and structure between the original 
Roman agreements and these Byzantine treaties.77  
 Although rooted in Roman tradition, surrender agreements in the Islamic empire 
underwent two distinct phases. The first phase was the time period during which 
surrender agreements were in their original, relatively untouched state. During this phase, 
the Muslim conquerors were taking control of lands such as Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and 
Iran, and were concluding agreements with the conquered non-Muslims who accepted 
Muslim protection and became dhimmis. These genuine surrender agreements were 
usually detailed but also generally minimalistic with respect to the restrictions they 
imposed on the conquered non-Muslims.78 As seen in the Treaty of Tudmir, the detail in 
these agreements were centered around the annual taxes that the conquered non-Muslims 
had to pay.79 Otherwise, these surrender agreements do not impose burdensome 
restrictions on the lives of non-Muslims, generally leaving them to live in peace. These 
initial documents were constructed in this manner because the Muslim conquerors were 
few in numbers and thus, a tiny minority in the newly conquered lands.80 As a result, they 
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were content being recognized as the Muslim elite by the conquered populations, living 
well, and collecting taxes from non-Muslims. 
 In addition to Muslims’ low numbers, they were also willing to accept such 
simple agreements because the vast majority of Muslims living in these new territories 
did not actually live together with non-Muslims. Instead, in the early decades following 
the initial conquest of an area, Muslims lived in amsar or garrison towns which were 
built separate from established non-Muslims towns.81 In the minds of Muslims, these 
amsar were necessary since they were superior to the conquered and thus they should not 
“mix” with them.82 Gradually, however, the two sides began to intermingle as Muslim 
conquerors and their progeny would stop serving as soldiers and start taking up trades. In 
addition, Muslims began intermarrying with non-Muslim women or mawali (local non-
Arab converts to Islam). Over time, residents of amsar moved into areas heavily 
populated with non-Muslims while non-Muslims started infiltrating amsar. Interestingly, 
it is this intermixing in cities and towns that caused non-Muslims to appear to have too 
many rights as Muslims began to constantly compared themselves to their non-Muslim 
neighbors.83  
Phase two was generated by Muslims’ upset with the liberal conditions non-
Muslims were granted in the initial surrender agreements. As the number of Muslims rose 
in these territories (due to immigration, the conversion of non-Muslims, and the stability 
of the caliphate), these liberal rights became intolerable for Muslims.84 In the eyes of this 
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group, being Muslim gave them an inherent superiority over people of other religions and 
ethnicities, particularly in the public sphere.85 By the eighth and ninth centuries, Muslims 
believed that their superiority was guaranteed by the Qur’an and the major tenets of 
Islamic law and political theory. As a result, their status needed to be seen and reflected 
in the happenings of daily life. However, the reason that it was not, was all thanks to the 
initial agreements.  
Revealed by Muslims’ dissatisfaction, it is at this point that the historical 
conditions had clearly changed. It was apparent that what had worked for the conquering 
Muslims during the initial conquests started appearing inappropriate for the politically 
and militarily dominant Muslims several generations later. With the centralization of the 
Abbasid state, there appeared the perceived need to come up with some sort of standard 
rules and regulations for dhimmis in order to satisfy the empire’s Muslim population. As 
a result, Muslim jurists in the late eighth and ninth centuries started thinking about how to 
change the regulations for dhimmis so that they reflected their “humble” social and 
political standing.86 However, due to the legally binding nature of the initial agreements, 
the regulations for dhimmis could not be changed without making the Muslims look as if 
they were reneging on their own surrender agreements from the early days of the 
conquests.87  
In order to get around this little problem, Muslims jurists decided to start 
proposing new regulations under the disguise of "ancient surrender agreements". They 
did this by presenting new strict regulations as “ancient traditions” that were part of the 
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early, original surrender agreements. Allegedly forgotten or lost, since these harsh 
stipulations were part of the original agreements, the jurists were able to legally justify 
“reintroducing” them. Though this argument was completely bogus, jurists declared that 
dhimmis had broken the initial stipulations as spelled out in the original surrender 
agreements and therefore they now needed tougher regulation. As one would expect, 
these “ancient” stipulations used questionable evidence to back up their claims such as 
unreliable Hadith reports.88 Another justification jurists gave for stricter, standardized 
regulations was the diverse array of surrender agreements that existed.89 Since each town 
could have a slightly different agreement based on their circumstances, it could be 
difficult for Muslims to keep these agreements straight and fueled their outrage at the 
freedoms of non-Muslims. 
As a result of these developments, various competing agreements arose, each of 
which worked to standardized and strengthen dhimmi regulations. Chief among these, 
was the Shurut Umar (Pact of Umar). Although originally written around 800 CE, this 
“agreement” and its long list of strict restrictions were passed off as being part of an 
original surrender agreement from the time of the conquest.90 In fact, jurists attributed the 
formation of this document to caliph ‘Umar I during his rule from 634 CE to 644 CE.91 
By crediting ‘Umar I with creating this agreement, Muslim jurists were able to add 
credence and historical context to their claim that this document was part of the early 
agreements. Ultimately, the Shurut Umar (Pact of Umar) won out as the empire’s 
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canonized agreement and its regulations became the ones that all dhimmis now had to 
abide by under Islamic law.92  
Although disguised as authentic, legal obligations, at their core, the Shurut 
Umar’s new regulations were meant to humble the non-Muslims who lived in cities with 
Muslims. In order to accomplish this, these obligations were designed to visibly 
showcase Muslims’ social and political superiority over non-Muslims.93 According to al-
Turtushi’s translated version of the document, stipulations included not bearing any kind 
of arms, not building houses taller than Muslim houses, not imitating Muslims in speech, 
and rising from their seats when Muslims wanted to sit.94 In addition, non-Muslims were 
banned from building new places of worship, wearing personal attire similar to Muslim 
attire, using transportation animals like horses, and restricted on how and when they 
could publicly practice their faith.95 As one can see, compared to the true, early 
agreements, these additions seriously restricted the lives of non-Muslims in both the 
public and the private sphere.  
In fact, these stipulations had larger implications than just what non-Muslims 
could wear on a daily basis. Although these obligations were not enforced to the same 
degree everywhere in the empire, their introduction was felt sharply. For example, if non-
Muslims could not use horses, it would have been extremely difficult to travel outside a 
small area. In addition, a non-Muslim could not work in numerous professions like being 
a trader or a merchant if he could not use a horse. Another far reaching consequence of 
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these obligations is the changes it would prompt in non-Muslim religious practices. For 
instance, since adherents could not conduct processions on Palm Sunday and Easter, how 
this celebration was observed each year had to be significantly altered to meet Islamic 
stipulations.96 This impact holds true when one considers the fact that non-Muslims were 
also not able to raise their voices in church, use clappers except at a very soft volume, or 
bury their dead near Muslims just to name a few of these new obligations. Overall, the 
Shurut Umar had a significant, long lasting impact on the lives of non-Muslims by 
revoking many of their previous rights. 
Based on this explanation, it is clear that the surrender agreements, their 
stipulations, and how they facilitate integration had a significant impact on the social and 
political structure of the empire. From the caliph to the a non-Muslim farmer, the impact 
of these agreements influenced daily life. For the common people, they determined how 
one behaved, dressed, worshiped, and worked. On the other side, these agreements ran 
the empire’s administration by allowing them to set up a structure based on the collection 
of non-Muslim taxes. Additionally, when these agreements were not honored, people 
noticed and it was viable fuel to help spark one of the various rebellions that emerged 
during the Umayyad Caliphate. Overall, there is evidence that, at least initially, Muslim 
conquerors were purposefully using surrender agreements to help integrate non-Muslims.  
Conclusion 
By utilizing surrender agreements, the Islamic empire was able to gain much 
needed legitimacy and facilitate the integration of non-Muslims from their conquered 
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territories into their newly established society. Rooted in Roman tradition, these early 
documents were straightforward in nature, simply exchanging the promise of protection 
and relative independence on the part of the Muslims for the payment of jizya by non-
Muslims. In general, these original surrender agreements did not impose many 
restrictions on the lives of the conquered non-Muslims and allowed them to continue on 
with their regular lives relatively undisturbed. This paired with their adaptable nature 
made surrender agreement an ideal tool to promote non-Muslim integration into the 
Islamic caliphate. 
In addition, surrender agreements established the initial dhimmi status of the 
conquered and outline their relationship with the Muslim conquerors. By doing this, these 
documents created a social and legal framework in which a new Muslim society could be 
established and gradually develop. Furthermore, since they were legally binding, non-
Muslims could ensure that Muslims preserved their rights throughout the centuries and 
vice versa. Over time, these agreements were incorporated into siyar and understood to 
be a piece of genuine Islamic law. 
While the surrender agreements made during the Islamic conquests clearly 
facilitated non-Muslim integration, the same cannot be said for the Shurut Umar. 
Although marketed as an “ancient agreement’, this document was not a part of the 
agreements established during the conquests. In addition, the Shurut Umar was an 
essential component of Muslims’ quest to limit the rights of non-Muslims in the late 
eighth and early ninth centuries. Eventually incorporated into Islamic law, this document 
standardized surrender agreements in the Islamic empire and greatly limited non-Muslims 
freedoms in an effort to reinforce Muslim superiority. Due to these restrictions, the 
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Shurut Umar was not meant to aid non-Muslims integration as the empire moved beyond 
this objective in the early ninth century. 
Although there are issues with seventh and eighth century research, additional 
work will help unveil the mysteries of surrender agreements and push other scholars to 
carry on researching this subject. As historians know, it will take constant, thorough 
research to confirm with certainty that all the assertations in this paper are correct across 
all geographic regions. Thankfully, it is possible that other scholars can continue this 
research and push surrender agreements into the limelight. So, although more research 
needs to be done, it is clear that early surrender agreements contributed to non-Muslims’ 





Illustration 1. Map of the locations of surrender treaties and vassal treaties (only where the actual text of 
the treaty is cited). 
Citation: Levy-Rubin, Milka. Non-Muslims in the Early Islamic Empire : From Surrender to  




Illustration 2. This is a map of the Islamic empire at the end of the Umayyad Caliphate in 750 CE. Dark green 
represents the Prophet Muhammad’s consolidation, medium green is the Rashidun’s conquests, and light green depicts 
the Umayyad’s conquests. 
Citation: Khan, Syed Muhammad. “Umayyad Dynasty.” Ancient History Encyclopedia. Ancient History 
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